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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Prophylactic injunctions first appeared on the remedial scene 
in the mid-1960s.1  Together with structural injunctions, they formed 
the corpus of public law injunctions that were used to address social 
institutional problems, such as school desegregation and prison civil 
rights violations.  “Prophylactic” measures were distinguished by 
their breadth and specificity that reached the facilitators of harm in 
order to prevent continued illegality.2  The success of prophylactic 
relief, however, soon raised the ire of conservative critics who 
attacked the ability of courts to enact injunctive relief that extended 
“beyond the right,”3 for academics had initially theorized 
                                                 
* Professor of Law and Director of Faculty Research and Development, 
The University of Akron.  This paper was presented at the 2007 Annual Meeting 
of the American Association of Law Schools as part of the panel “What’s 
Happening With Injunctions?” during the Workshop on Remedies: Justice and the 
Bottom Line. 
1. E.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 
U.S. 180 (1963) (imposing prophylactic order on investment advisor requiring 
preventive disclosures to future clients). 
2. Tracy A. Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy: Normative Principles and 
Definitional Parameters of Broad Injunctive Relief, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 301, 309 
(2004) [hereinafter Thomas, Prophylactic Remedy]. 
3. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: 
Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 103–
06 (1979) (arguing that the legitimacy of courts is threatened by the extrajudicial, 
political action of structural relief that seeks to produce social outcomes); William 
A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial 
Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 648–49 (1982) (claiming that courts lack 
institutional authority to normatively assess social solutions through institutional 
remedies); Donald Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial 
Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1303 (1983) (arguing that 
“organizational change” cases of public law injunctions do not naturally follow 
from the declared right, but rather stem from improper considerations of the 
managerial effectiveness of the relief); Alfred M. Mamlet, Reconsideration of 
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prophylactic relief as “deliberately fashioned rather than logically 
deduced from the nature of the legal harm suffered.”4  Reacting to 
the conceptualization of prophylaxis as the power of an omnipotent 
judge to enact new social norms based on what was morally just, 
these critics turned the prophylaxis label into an epithet. 
This essay critiques the continued dominant discourse of 
prophylaxis as illegitimate.  Despite the harsh academic and political 
criticism, prophylaxis continues to thrive as an effective and 
necessary component of the practical remediation of complex cases.5  
Exploring the contours of prophylactic relief in federal cases 
involving schools, prisons, and sexual harassment, this essay 
illustrates how prophylactic relief continues to be used as a powerful 
and effective remedy.  The continued use, however, demands an 
alternative theory of justification for prophylactic relief, for neither 
the image of an omnipotent judge nor that of an activist policymaker 
adequately explains the actual remedial practice.  Prophylactic relief 
is instead used by the courts in a more traditional and tailored way to 
address public law problems.  Ultimately, this essay seeks to provide 
an alternative text for lawyers and jurists to use on the legal 
                                                                                                                
Separation of Powers and the Bargaining Game: Limiting the Policy Discretion of 
Judges and Plaintiffs in Institutional Suits, 33 EMORY L.J. 685, 685–86 (1984) 
(arguing that courts in public law litigation improperly exercise legislative and 
executive discretion by going beyond the traditional judicial role of enjoining the 
unconstitutional practice and affirmatively prescribing governmental policy); Paul 
J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949, 956, 
972 (1978) (arguing that the proliferation of institutional remedies has improperly 
broadened the scope of constitutional rights); Robert F. Nagel, Separation of 
Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 664 
(1978) (arguing that separation of powers principles limit the ability of courts to 
order structural and prophylactic relief against state officials). 
4. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1281, 1298 (1976). 
5. See generally Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A 
Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550 (2006) 
(collecting data on continued prevalence of prophylactic and structural injunctions 
in prison reform cases); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization 
Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004) 
(discussing the persistence of public law injunctive remedies and their continued 
value to the courts); Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the Structural Reform 
Injunction: Oops . . . It’s Still Moving!, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 143 (2003) (arguing 
that the structural reform injunction is still alive and well in American 
jurisprudence despite assertions of its demise).  
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frontlines to address questions of the legitimate and appropriate use 
of broad injunctive relief. 
 
 
II. THE DIFFERENCE A NAME MAKES 
 
The term “prophylactic” derives from the Supreme Court’s 
label for a specific type of injunctive relief, used both descriptively 
and pejoratively by the Justices.6  The terminology usually triggers 
laughs and guffaws from those hearing it for the first time.  Yet, the 
analogy to medical prophylaxis is useful as it connotes the use of 
additional measures implemented preventively to avoid a greater 
harm to an individual.  Moreover, we are often stuck with the text we 
are given, and here the ability to communicate effectively about the 
parameters of prophylaxis requires using the existing language 
common to the decided cases. 
Prophylactic injunctions, like consequential damages, reach 
the secondary effects of harm.  Prophylaxis is characterized by the 
specific precautionary measures imposed to address causal factors 
with a nexus to continued violations.  It is differentiated by the use of 
precautions ordered to address secondary facilitators of harm to 
provide more effective prevention.  The additional steps reaching 
contributing causes are ordered with the purpose of heading off the 
harm before it develops. 
Some common types of prophylactic measures emerge from 
the cases.  The first type involves evaluation and monitoring 
measures, such as a duty to report to the court, provide access to an 
investigator, or implement some ongoing oversight.7  Courts also 
                                                 
6. E.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 382 
(1997) (Rehnquist, J.) (describing prophylactic measures as necessary where 
traditional injunctions alone are insufficient); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 711–
12 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (attacking the Court’s endorsement of 
“prophylactic” measure in prison reform case as illegitimate). 
7. See, e.g., Skinner v. Lampert, 457 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (D. Wyo. 2006) 
(enforcing order to monitor inmate conflicts and problematic staff members, and 
terminating prior orders to investigate complaints, create incident reports, and 
discipline staff); Schmelzer ex. rel Schmelzer v. New York, 363 F. Supp. 2d 453, 
460–461 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (appointing monitor to submit regular reports on 
compliance with Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) requirement 
of timely appeals for decisions regarding disabled children after defendants’ 
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require defendants to develop express policies to address institutional 
culture and create consequences for enforcement of the policies.8  
Another type of prophylactic measure is one establishing a process 
or procedure like procedural safeguards, notice provisions, or 
communication networks.9  Education is also a common 
prophylactic measure where defendants are ordered to disseminate 
information and train employees about the relevant processes and 
procedures.10 
Prophylaxis constitutes a distinct type of injunction within 
the existing nomenclature of the law.  The existing classification of 
injunctive relief derives from Owen Fiss’s 1978 work, The Civil 
Rights Injunction.  Fiss identified three types of injunctive relief:  
preventive, reparative, and structural.11  Preventive injunctions are 
simple commands to stop the illegal act, such as ordering the 
defendants to “stop discrimination.”12  Reparative injunctions repair 
the ongoing consequences of the past harm, and might order the 
reinstatement of an employee fired because of discrimination.13   
Fiss’s third category of structural injunctions was used to describe 
the remaining incidence of public law injunctions, especially those 
that ordered change of an institutional structure to prevent further 
discrimination.14  The classic illustration of a structural injunction is 
                                                                                                                
repeated refusals to comply); Jones ’El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1125–26 
(W.D. Wis. 2001) (requiring prison to engage professional services to evaluate 
incoming prisoners’ mental health, but refusing plaintiffs’ requests for monthly 
court-supervised monitoring). 
8. See, e.g., Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. District of 
Columbia, 877 F. Supp. 634, 679–80 (D.D.C. 1994) (ordering creation of sexual 
harassment policy after consultation with national prison experts); Wyatt v. 
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 379 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (ordering patient bill of rights 
spelling out minimal rights and duties).  
9. See, e.g., In re Nicholson, 181 F. Supp. 2d 182, 190–92 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(ordering extensive protections prior to welfare agency’s removal of children from 
custody of battered mothers, including preparing bilingual informational 
pamphlets, limiting removal periods, and creating a review committee); Bundy v. 
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (ordering procedure for “hearing, 
adjudicating, and remedying” complaints of sexual harassment of prison staff). 
10. See, e.g., Women Prisoners, 877 F. Supp. at 681–82 (ordering training of 
both staff and inmates conducted by industry expert on sexual harassment); Bundy, 
641 F.2d at 948 (ordering training on how to report sexual harassment). 
11. OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 7–8 (1978). 
12. Id. 
13. Id.  
14. Id. at 7. 
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an order to integrate the schools to rectify or prevent continued racial 
discrimination.15  Prophylactic measures were bound up in structural 
relief as part of complex orders directing appropriate preventive 
steps for defendant institutions.  As I have discussed in prior work, 
the courts eventually began to carve out these prophylactic measures 
from the structural injunction ball of wax because they differed 
significantly in character and because categorization enabled courts 
to refine the contours of such relief. 16       
 
          Prophylactic  
     FACILITATORS     
 
                       Preventive            Reparative     
                CAUSE-------HARM-----CONSEQUENCES 
                 
             
     FACILITATORS  
        S   T   R   U   C   T   U   R   A   L 
 
The value of recognizing a separate category of prophylactic 
injunctions lies in the ability to use the doctrinal language as a 
yardstick of legitimacy.  The adoption of a fourth classification of 
injunctive relief offers an analytical foundation for the legitimacy of 
some, but not all, prophylactic measures.  The classification counters 
some of the criticism of prophylaxis (and all public law injunctions) 
by circumscribing the scope of appropriately broad relief.  
Encapsulated as a doctrinal rule, prophylaxis provides a legal text for 
lawyers to use in navigating the policy concerns involved in crafting 
appropriate injunctive relief.  
 
 
                                                 
15. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1955) (Brown 
II). 
16. Thomas, Prophylactic Remedy, supra note 2, at 316–21; see also Tracy 
A. Thomas, Understanding Prophylactic Remedies Through the Looking Glass of 
Bush v. Gore, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 343, 373 (2002) [hereinafter Thomas, 
Understanding Prophylactic Remedies] (distinguishing prophylactic remedies 
from other remedies).  
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III. PROPHYLAXIS IN ACTION 
 
Prophylaxis came to the forefront through its grassroots 
development in institutional reform cases involving schools, prisons, 
and other public institutions.  Prophylaxis can be effective against 
institutional defendants when faced with the difficulties of enforcing 
judicial relief against legislative or administrative agents.17  Yet its 
effectiveness has not been confined to public settings, as the remedy 
can be found in business and economic regulation cases.18  The 
functionality of the prophylactic remedy transcends the specific 
context of a case as it enables courts to translate abstract norms into 
concrete action.  
I came to my own understanding of prophylactic remedies 
while litigating a prison reform case in practice.  In the case of 
Women Prisoners of the D.C. Department of Corrections v. District 
of Columbia, we were faced with the task of crafting proposed relief 
for the class of women prisoners following a successful trial 
establishing constitutional violations from the sexual harassment and 
assault of the women, the unhealthy environmental conditions, and 
the gender discrimination in work and educational programs.19  The 
defendants’ history of similar violations and the egregious nature of 
the harms weighed in favor of practical alternatives that could 
effectively halt the behavior.  We developed a series of measures—
including a hotline, grievance system, reporting mechanisms, expert 
                                                 
17. See Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal 
Remedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 766–69 (1992) (discussing how the Court’s 
decisions regarding enforcement of remedies tolerate “channeled defiance” of 
federal court remedial orders); Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE 
L.J. 585, 587 (1983) (“The function of a remedy is to ‘realize’ a legal norm, to 
make it a ‘living truth.’  While most legal theory concentrates on the ideal, the 
hard stuff of recalcitrant reality is equally important to jurisprudence.”). 
18. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d. 144, 164 
(2002) (imposing prophylactic measures to prevent antitrust monopoly); Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 181 (1963) 
(ordering investment advisor to disclose his own personal dealings in securities 
recommended to clients in order to prevent fraud). 
19. 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994), modified, 899 F. Supp. 659 (D.D.C. 
1995), vacated in part, 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (affirming all injunctive 
measures in extensive order related to constitutional claims, but invalidating 
appointment of special officer to monitor and investigate complaints). 
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consultation and staff training—designed to head off the problems 
by addressing the contributing causes of the harm.20 
In this way, prophylactic relief develops almost instinctively 
from lawyers and jurists seeking remedial alternatives to empty 
commands simply to stop the behavior.  The actors in the legal 
drama are closest to the specifics and details of the case and can 
readily identify what types of preventive steps might effectively curb 
the illegal behavior in the future.  Prophylaxis therefore has a 
practical, intuitive appeal that resonates with practitioners and judges 
who seek tangible remedial solutions to difficult problems. 
The grassroots evolution of prophylactic relief has developed 
in many institutional contexts.  Today, such relief has become 
commonplace in sexual harassment cases.  Rather than simply 
commanding the offending institution to “harass no more,” courts 
order policy changes, training, education, and sanctions to address 
institutional factors that facilitate continued harassment.21  The 
preventive power of prophylactic measures has taken on new 
meaning as the U.S. Supreme Court has elevated these measures to 
the stature of a safe haven from liability.  In Kolstad v. American 
Dental Association, the Court held that a company that voluntarily 
adopts prophylactic measures, like anti-harassment programs, 
demonstrates the good faith necessary to avoid punitive damages 
under a vicarious liability theory.22   
Another prototypical category of prophylactic relief comes 
from the school desegregation cases.  The desegregation cases 
helped develop prophylactic relief as courts struggled to deal with 
the difficult legal problem of entrenched race discrimination and 
contemptuous defendants.  For example, in the case of Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, approved prophylactic 
measures included racial quotas, gerrymandered attendance zones, 
                                                 
20. Id. at 679–81. 
21. E.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 946–948 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
(ordering institution to adopt procedures for “hearing, adjudicating, and 
remedying” staff complaints of sexual harassment); Sims v. Montgomery County, 
766 F. Supp. 1052, 1080 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (ordering grievance procedures, officer 
education program, and changes in procedures for promotions, discipline, 
transfers, and job assignments); Lynch v. City of Des Moines, 454 N.W.2d 827, 
829 (Iowa 1990) (upholding injunction requiring sexual harassment education and 
training plan). 
22. 527 U.S. 526, 545–46 (1999). 
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and busing, as the courts tried to reach the contributing economic 
and residential causes of continued segregation.23  More recently, 
courts have adapted prophylactic measures in school cases to address 
violations of federal statutes like Title IX and special education 
laws.24 
Prophylactic relief grew in popularity in the prison conditions 
cases spanning the end of the twentieth century.  Recalcitrant prison 
defendants were forced into a semblance of compliance by court 
orders dictating specific measures to avoid unconstitutional 
conditions.  Prisons were given detailed orders regarding law 
libraries, environment, health, recreation, punishment, and food in 
order to curtail continued abuses.25  Such prison litigation became 
the political target of conservative reformers who sought to restrict 
the expansion of public law injunctions.26 
Congress responded to the perception of illegitimate 
prophylactic relief in prison condition cases by enacting the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”).27  The PLRA targeted 
negotiated consent decrees, but requires that all injunctions be 
“narrowly drawn,” “extend[] no further than necessary,” and be “the 
                                                 
23. 402 U.S. 1, 22–31 (1971).  
24. E.g., Schmelzer ex. rel. Schmelzer v. New York, 363 F. Supp. 2d 453, 
461 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (appointing monitor to submit regular reports on compliance 
with the IDEA’s requirement of timely appeals for decisions regarding disabled 
children after defendants’ repeated refusals to comply).  
25. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (limiting time in punitive 
isolation); Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2001) (ordering prison to 
modify policies and procedures to provide reasonable accommodations to disabled 
prisoners and parolees, to provide effective communication regarding hearings and 
appeals, and to select accessible facilities); Jones ’El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 
1096 (W.D. Wis. 2001) (requiring prison to engage professional services to 
evaluate incoming prisoners’ mental health). 
26. 141 CONG. REC. S14611, S14626 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of 
Sen. Dole) (speaking in support of proposed legislation that would “restrain liberal 
Federal judges who see violations of constitutional rights in every prisoner 
complaint and who have used these complaints to micromanage State and local 
prison systems”); id. (statement of Sen. Hatch) (asserting that judges had “gone too 
far in micromanaging our Nation’s prisons”); Edwin Meese III, Putting the 
Federal Judiciary Back on the Constitutional Track, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 781, 
790–93 (1998) (arguing that Congress should “block activist federal judges” and 
limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts in cases like prison litigation where it 
was dissatisfied with the judicial results). 
27. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, & 42 U.S.C.). 
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least intrusive means necessary” to correct a violation of a federal 
right.28  While the PLRA curtailed some use of injunctive measures 
in prisons, courts have continued to use prophylactic measures 
effectively in conditions cases.29  The PLRA, however, stands as an 
example of what many critics believe is the right approach to 
restricting the scope and prevalence of public law injunctions.30 
 
 
IV. DISPUTING PROPHYLAXIS AS JUDICIAL ACTIVISM  
 
The dominant narrative of prophylactic and structural relief is 
that it is judicial policymaking and unwarranted judicial activism.31  
The accusation is that the remedies go beyond the right and are based 
illegitimately on the judge’s personal vision of justice rather than on 
proper law, facts, and judicial authority.32  Courts are accused of 
                                                 
28. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1) (1997). 
29. See, e.g., Skinner v. Lampert, 457 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1276–85 (D. Wyo. 
2006) (finding prophylactic measures requiring conflict documentation system, 
investigation, reporting, incident tracking, education, and incorporation of policies 
to be narrowly tailored to harm of preventing inmate violence as required by 
PLRA); Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 872–73 (finding prophylactic measures designed 
to prevent violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act by prison were 
appropriate under the PLRA). 
30. See ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE 
191–92 (2003) (arguing that courts and Congress should follow the PLRA’s model 
of restriction for all public law injunctions); Meese, supra note 26, at 790–93 
(calling for more legislative strategies like the PLRA to enable Congress to change 
the policies and practices resulting from judicial decisions).  
31. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) (Scalia, J.) (“It is the 
role of courts to provide relief to claimants . . . it is not the role of courts, but that 
of the political branches, to shape the institutions of government in such fashion as 
to comply with the laws and the Constitution.”); id. at 364 (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (asserting that the Constitution charges federal judges with deciding 
cases and controversies, not dictating policy); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 
132 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“There simply are certain things that courts, 
in order to remain courts, cannot and should not do.”); see generally John Choon 
Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of 
the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1123–24 (1996) (arguing that the 
judiciary’s assertion of inherent remedial power for structural injunctions violates 
principles of judicial restraint and oversteps the Article III limitations on the 
federal courts). 
32. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 3, at 649 (claiming that prophylactic and 
structural injunctions are based upon the moral and political intuitions of judges); 
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“micro-managing” and invading the power of the state administrative 
authorities to make and execute policy decisions.33  This attack on 
prophylaxis is part of a broader attack on public law remedies that 
highlights problems with complex decrees, aspirational rights, and 
the controlling power group of the plaintiffs’ attorneys, special 
masters, and cooperative defendants.34 
The criticism of prophylactic relief as judicial activism is an 
obvious reaction to the original theorization of public law relief as 
unfettered judicial power.  Images of a moralistic judge imposing 
new legal norms through a participatory rather than adjudicatory 
process set up prophylactic relief as an alternative to regular judicial 
action.   Professors Fiss and Chayes originally argued that judges 
should engage in social justice and the preservation of public values 
by doing what was “right” through the use of public law 
injunctions.35  They envisioned a moralistic judge who would rectify 
injustice by the elaboration and expansion of legal norms.  At the 
same time, a corollary theory developed arguing for a participatory, 
                                                                                                                
Horowitz, supra note 3, at 1304 (arguing that judges in institutional remedy cases 
are “vehemently partisan” and personally invested in the outcome of the 
litigation); Mishkin, supra note 3, at 960 (suggesting that institutional decrees are a 
result of the judge’s personal desire to do good and eliminate a social evil). 
33. See, e.g., SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 30, at 7–8 (asserting that 
institutional reform injunctions constitute “democracy by decree” where judges 
make policy decisions and dictate how to comply with the law, thus improperly 
assuming the responsibilities of mayors, governors, and legislators); Nagel, supra 
note 3, at 706–23 (critiquing structural injunctions on separation of powers 
grounds). 
34. For example, Ross Sandler and David Schoenbrod argue against the 
ability of courts to issue public law injunctions, and particularly consent decrees, 
because of threats to accountability and democracy raised by the difficulties of 
enforcing aspirational rights; problems with the controlling group of plaintiffs’ 
attorneys and acquiescent defendants; case management problems of special 
masters; exploding class actions; and the ineffectiveness of such decrees.  
SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 30, at 9–12.  However, they reserve the 
power of the court to issue prophylactic injunctive measures where the defendant 
is likely to evade the decree.  Id. at 166; see also David Schoenbrod, The Measure 
of an Injunction: A Principle to Replace Balancing the Equities and Tailoring the 
Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 627, 671–82 (1988) (arguing that judges may issue 
prophylactic injunctions in situations demonstrating the defendant’s proclivity to 
violate an order).  
35. Chayes, supra note 4, at 1282–83; Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law 
Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 55 (1982); Owen M. Fiss, 
Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979); OWEN M. FISS, 
THE LAW AS IT COULD BE xi–xii (2003). 
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deliberative process alternative to litigation for public law remedies 
and their polycentric problems.36  The argument was that traditional 
litigation was unable to handle the complexity and enforcement of 
public law rights, which required more problem-solving techniques 
and procedures found in mediation or administrative processes.37  
This notion of the incapacity of litigation to handle institutional 
reform cases reinforced the notion of prophylaxis as something 
extra-judicial.  Finally, prophylaxis was justified as a judicial “rule” 
of interpretation or implementation inspired by the legal right.38  
This construct moves prophylaxis closer to the normal range of 
judicial activity, but reinforces the notion of judicial omnipotence.  
These theories promoting judicial remedial activism and reforming 
courts continue to dominate modern discourse.39  However, 
justifications based on judicial omnipotence and extra-judicial 
conduct draw criticism like magnets. 
The theories of judicial omnipotence jeopardize the 
availability of prophylactic relief by conceptualizing it as something 
                                                 
36. See Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 
GEO. L.J. 1355, 1427–44 (1991) (outlining a “deliberative model of public 
remedial decisionmaking”); Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 
HARV. L. REV. 353, 394–404 (1978) (distinguishing private, bilateral adjudication, 
from “polycentric,” multi-party, multi-issue, policy-driven public litigation). 
37. Sturm, supra note 36, at 1357, 1428. 
38. See Henry Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 19 (1975) (“[T]he case law . . . is . . . highly suggestive of a sizable 
body of constitutionally inspired implementing rules whose only sources are 
constitutional provisions framed as limitations on government.”); David A. 
Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 195 (1988) 
(asserting that there is nothing “extraordinary” about prophylactic rules that 
impose additional requirements beyond those of the Constitution itself and that 
such rules can be “justified in ways that are analytically indistinguishable from the 
justifications for the Miranda rules”).  
39. See, e.g., Beth V. v. Carroll, 155 F.R.D. 529, 530, 533 (E.D. Pa. 1994) 
(citing with favor Chayes’ theory of the role of the judge in public law litigation 
and discussing the need for alternative deliberative processes in decision 
appointing special master for special education case); FISS, supra note 35, at 48–55 
(discussing the “structural reform” model of adjudication based on the notion that 
judges give concrete meaning and expression to the public values embodied in the 
law); MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND 
THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 3–6 
(1998) (arguing that judges should continue to engage in judicial policymaking in 
the context of prison reform litigation). 
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outside the judicial norm.  If prophylaxis cannot be accomplished 
using the regular adjudicatory process and common judicial 
practices, then it does not belong within the halls of the judiciary.40  
The theories of moral justice thus risk the evisceration of the 
prophylactic remedy. 
However, the existing theories of omnipotent judging do not 
accurately describe the operation of prophylactic relief.  Recent 
analyses supporting public law remedies challenge the social justice 
theories and place public law remedies within the usual realm of 
judicial remedial action.41  The prevalence of prophylaxis suggests 
the time has come to stop theorizing prophylaxis as other.  The 
alleged hallmarks of public law litigation—justice, rulemaking, and 
alternative dispute resolution—are found in most cases.42  Private 
law litigation is no longer segregated, assuming it ever was, from 
public law litigation by these attributes of judicial problem solving.43  
The polycentric nature of the issues in many public law cases is also 
nothing unusual, as the advent of class actions, mass torts, and other 
aggregative litigation make such large-scale cases commonplace. 
In other words, prophylaxis needs no supporting theory other 
than that generally applicable to equitable relief.  Of course, the 
                                                 
40. See Diver, supra note 3, at 63 (arguing against public law injunctions on 
the ground that the judicial intuition model falls outside the objective, rational 
norm of the adjudication model). 
41. See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 5, at 1100 (noting that the process of 
public law litigation is consistent with judicial practice in common law cases and 
compatible with democratic accountability); Thomas, Prophylactic Remedy, supra 
note 2, at 362–70 (refuting the standard assumption that judges create prophylactic 
remedies out of whole cloth, and instead demonstrating the ordinary judicial 
processes of hearings, evidence, and factual-findings utilized in such cases); 
Wendy Parker, The Decline of Judicial Decisionmaking: School Desegregation 
and District Court Judges, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1623, 1627–28 (2003) (concluding 
from study of school desegregation remedies from 1992 to 2002 that judges do not 
behave in atypical, activist ways in imposing public law remedies, but rather 
follow a process common to most private litigation). 
42. Honorable William Wayne Justice, The Two Faces of Judicial Activism, 
Address at the George Washington Univ. Nat’l Law Center (Mar. 10, 1992), in 61 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1992) (asserting that so-called “remedial activism” 
is nothing more than the traditional role of the judge to resolve disputes in both 
private and public law matters). 
43. Thomas, Prophylactic Remedy, supra note 2, at 362–63; Robert G. Bone, 
Lon Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy Between Dispute 
Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1273, 1296–98 
(1995). 
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equitable power of the court itself has also been under attack.44  
However, the judicial equity power is well-grounded in our 
common-law system as a fluid and flexible power necessary to 
redress gaps in the law.45  Prophylaxis is part of this heritage of 
equity that empowers courts to enforce legal rights in a meaningful 
way. 
 
 
V. THE FUTURE OF PROPHYLAXIS 
 
My prediction is that prophylactic injunctions will continue 
as courts learn to tailor relief appropriately in order to take advantage 
of the efficacy of prophylaxis.  As a precise remedial mechanism, 
rather than a catchall power, prophylaxis promises to remain a viable 
remedial tool.  The evidence is clear that public law injunctions are 
alive and well.  Despite the conventional wisdom that institutional 
reform litigation peaked long ago, the studies show the continued 
utility and importance of public law injunctions.46  Prophylaxis 
seems to work.  It provides practical, tangible solutions to often 
insurmountable problems involving intangible rights. 
Over time, the courts have resisted efforts to turn 
prophylactic relief into a catchall remedy and instead have 
                                                 
44. See, e.g., Doug Rendleman, Brown II’s “All Deliberate Speed” at Fifty: 
A Golden Anniversary or Mid-Life Crisis for the Constitutional Injunction as a 
School Desegregation Remedy?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1575, 1597–99 (2004) 
(detailing Justices Thomas’ and Scalia’s criticisms of equitable relief); Tracy A. 
Thomas, Justice Scalia Reinvents Restitution, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1063, 1070–74 
(2003) (describing Justice Scalia’s approach to narrowing equitable relief to only 
those traditional writs historically available under English common law). 
45. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the 
Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980) 
(demonstrating a historical foundation for complex public law injunctions as part 
of the “normal” litigation tradition). 
46. See, e.g., Schlanger, supra note 5, at 554 (concluding from longitudinal 
account of jail and prison injunctions that civil rights injunctions continue to 
thrive); Sabel & Simon, supra note 5, at 1018–19, 1021 (noting the “protean 
persistence of public law litigation” and concluding there “is no indication of a 
reduction in the volume or importance of Chayesian judicial activity”). 
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circumscribed its applicability.47  The many examples of prophylaxis 
gone awry have been used to invalidate the entire category of 
relief.48  The Fiss-Chayes theory of omnipotent judging encouraged 
courts to morph prophylaxis into a catchall, omnibus remedy.  Since 
then, however, remedial excess has carefully been reined in by the 
courts, which have followed the Supreme Court’s rules of limitation 
in evaluating the propriety of prophylactic relief.  Accordingly, 
courts have denied requested prophylactic relief in the absence of a 
legal harm.49  Prophylaxis has been denied when it is asserted as an 
entitlement, as when previously-ordered measures take on a life of 
their own.50  Courts have cut back on prophylactic measures when 
the asserted relief does not benefit the actual plaintiffs.51  These 
                                                 
47. See Schlanger, supra note 5, at 605 (documenting the transformation of 
public law injunctions in prison cases from a “kitchen sink” remedy to a refined 
remedial tool). 
48. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 362–63 (1996) (using one 
example of judicial overreaching in prison law library injunction to condemn all 
prophylactic and structural relief); SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 30, at 
139 (using a handful of examples of over-broad injunctions to conclude that 
“[d]emocracy by decree is a good thing gone wrong.”). 
49. See, e.g., Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350–351 (invalidating injunction mandating 
all aspects of an adequate prison law library where the operative right was the right 
of access to the courts, rather than a per se right to a library); Hadix v. Johnson, 
367 F.3d 513, 529 (6th Cir. 2004) (invalidating injunction where fire safety 
deficiencies failed to constitute constitutional violations); Sisneroz v. Whitman, 
No. 01-5058, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67107, at *9–10 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2006) 
(denying injunctive relief because “laundry list” of requests for conditions of 
prison confinement—such as limited strip searches, exercise periods, and cell 
assignments—did not relate to any actual imminent harm arising out of civil 
detention). 
50. See, e.g., Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000) (denying claim of failure 
to provide Anders brief for withdrawal of counsel because the procedure was 
simply a prophylactic measure ordered by the Court in a prior case to avoid future 
constitutional violations); Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350–51 (refusing to convert 
prophylactic measure of adequate prison law library ordered in Bounds v. Smith, 
430 U.S. 817 (1977) to ensure right of access to the courts into a federal right to 
prison libraries); see also Thomas, Understanding Prophylactic Remedies, supra 
note 16, at 379–85 (explaining and discounting the phenomenon by which 
prophylactic remedies create a mirage of new rights). 
51. See, e.g., Williams v. Bd. of Regents, 441 F.3d 1287, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 
2006) (denying requested relief of access to sexual harassment policies, 
investigation of complaints, and dispute resolution processes where plaintiff’s 
harassers had left university); Lewis, 518 U.S. at 359 (striking down systemwide 
remedy regarding various aspects of prison law library—including lighting, 
materials, operating hours, and bilingual materials—where relief did not connect to 
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limitations are really nothing new, as the usual rules of remedies 
require that a legal harm to the plaintiff be proven in court before 
imposition of a judicial remedy.  Thus, the usual limitations work to 
curtail prophylaxis and keep it from becoming anything and 
everything that does not fit within the confines of another remedy. 
In addition, prophylaxis’s future looks bright because it is a 
remedy of last resort.  It is not the first line of response for a court, 
but rather is reserved for particularly recalcitrant defendants.  
Significantly, institutional defendants are given a first chance to 
remedy the harm themselves.52  Only where that attempt fails, or 
where the defendant has violated a less intrusive preventive 
command or engaged in repeated patterns of illegal conduct, is there 
sufficient defiance to trigger prophylaxis.53  This results in a 
remedial rule of injunctive relief that is highly deferential to, and 
therefore more palatable to, defendants.54 
By limiting prophylaxis to its proper application—as a 
remedy of last resort protecting a proven right by addressing 
facilitators causally linked to the harm—courts have responded to 
the perceived abuse of prophylactic excess, leaving in place a viable 
                                                                                                                
plaintiff’s harm of denial of court access because of illiteracy); Hadix v. Johnson, 
173 F.3d 958, 964 (6th Cir. 1999) (overturning award of systemwide legal writer 
program to ensure prisoners were able to prepare legal pleadings on the ground 
that the district court interpreted prisoners’ injuries too broadly). 
52. See, e.g., Hadix v. Caruso, No. 4:92-CV-110, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
25295, at *20–21 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 2005) (requiring defendant prison to 
submit a remedial plan within 30 days after cooperative planning with plaintiffs); 
Ginest v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 333 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1209–10 (D. Wyo. 2004) 
(ordering prison to submit remedial plan within 30 days to improve gross defects 
in medical program); see Special Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional 
Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 797–99, 803 (1978) (describing 
“remedial abstention” in which the court defers to the defendants’ creation of an 
injunctive remedy). 
53. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 757 (1994) 
(upholding portions of a modified injunction against an anti-abortion group, where 
the group had violated a preliminary injunction to cease blocking or interfering 
with the clinic entrance). 
54. See Parker, supra note 41, at 1623 (arguing that the traditional role of the 
district judge in controlling school desegregation cases has been ceded to the 
defendants); Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and Public Law Remedies: A Tale 
of Two Kansas Cities, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 475, 511 (1999) (arguing that remedies in 
school desegregation cases are controlled by defendants, as dictated by the 
Supreme Court). 
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remedial option.  Rejecting the outmoded theories of prophylaxis as 
omnipotent judicial power stops the frontal attacks on such relief and 
directs scholars toward alternative theorization of public law relief.  
Given the prevalence of prophylaxis and its place within the normal 
remedial framework, its continued vitality is assured. 
